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This paper argues that self-awareness is a learned behavior that emerges in organisms whose
brains have a sufficiently integrated, complex ability for associative learning and memory. Continual
sensory input of information related to the organism causes the organism’s brain to learn the physical
characteristics of the organism, in the sense that neural pathways are produced that are reinforced
by, and therefore recognize, various features associated with the organism. More precisely, continual
sensory input leads to the formation of a set of associations that may be termed an organismal “self-
image”. The formation of a self-image, combined with an ability for sufficiently complex associative
memory and learning, provides a mechanistic basis for the emergence of various behaviors that
are typically associated with self-awareness. Self-recognition is the classic example. However, self-
awareness in humans includes additional behaviors such as recognition of self-awareness, the concept
of “I”, and various existential and religious questions. After providing the basic mechanistic basis
for the emergence of an organismal self-image, this paper proceeds to go through a representative
list of behaviors associated with self-awareness, and shows how associative memory and learning,
combined with an organismal self-image and, in the case of humans, language, leads to the emergence
of these various behaviors. This paper also discusses various tautologies that invariably emerge
when discussing self-awareness, that ultimately prevent an unambiguous resolution to the various
existential issues that arise. We continue with various speculations on manipulating self-awareness,
and discuss how concepts from set and logic may provide a highly useful set of tools in computational
neuroscience for understanding the emergence of higher cognitive functions in complex organisms.
The existence of other types of awareness, and the role of mirror neurons in the emergence of
self-awareness, are also briefly discussed.
Keywords: Self-awareness, consciousness, associative memory, associative learning, set theory, logic, tautolo-
gies
I. INTRODUCTION
Self-awareness is one of the most mysterious phenom-
ena in the natural world. Inanimate matter, through
the process of replicative selection, has managed to pro-
duce biochemical machines that can recognize them-
selves. The existence of self-awareness has provoked
much philosophical debate over the centuries, and, within
a theological context, is intimately connected with the
existence of a metaphysical “soul” [1].
While it was once widely believed that only humans
were truly self-aware, it was later discovered that the
great apes could recognize their own reflections, and
therefore had a much higher level of self-awareness than
previously thought. It was later discovered that dolphins
also exhibit this level of self-awareness. Recently, ele-
phants have been added to the list of animals capable of
recognizing their own reflections [2–4].
A major difficulty in understanding self-awareness has
been its theological association with the concept of a
“soul”. Because the phenomenon was regarded as mys-
terious, there have been relatively few scientific attempts
to attack the problem. It was essentially viewed as an
epiphenomenon associated with a sufficiently developed
intelligence [5, 6].
The development of sophisticated brain imaging tech-
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niques has allowed researchers to locate the regions of the
brain where self-awareness is located [7]. Specifically, it is
believed that self-awareness is processed in a region of the
brain called the Superior Frontal Gyrus [7]. However, the
origins of such brain structures are essentially a mystery.
That is, while there have been speculations as to the evo-
lutionary pressures that would select for self-awareness
[8–10], it is not clear whether self-awareness was inde-
pendently “hard-wired” into the brain, or whether it is a
property that emerges in a sufficiently developed central
nervous system. If it is a so-called “emergent property,”
then it is not clear what are the underlying dynamics of a
highly developed brain that leads to self-aware behavior.
A mechanistic study of self-awareness is possible, if
we abandon traditional philosophical attempts to de-
fine what it is (which is a meaningless question, in any
event), and instead attempt to study its operational as-
pects. According to Turing, a mechanistic approach
to self-awareness requires us to determine what behav-
iors we would associate with self-awareness, so that self-
awareness, in a precise sense, becomes defined by these
behaviors [11]. The next step is to then determine what
is the mechanistic basis for the emergence of such behav-
iors. Finally, we should then seek to determine how such
behaviors emerge in organismal brains. That is, are they
hard-wired, or are they learned?
Here, we argue that self-awareness is essentially a
learned behavior, that emerges in organisms with a suffi-
ciently complex and highly integrated ability for associa-
tive memory and learning. The idea is that the organ-
2ism’s brain perceives the external world from a specific
vantage point, and receives a continual set of inputs re-
lated to the organism as a result of this vantage point.
This continual set of inputs related to the organism leads
to the formation of neural pathways that define a set of
associations related to various aspects of the organism,
resulting in behavior consistent with self-recognition. We
call this set of associations the organismal “self-image”.
This paper is organized as follows: In the follow-
ing section (Section II), we describe in further de-
tail our speculation regarding the emergence of self-
awareness. In Section III, we consider various aspects
of self-awareness, and speculate as to the possible mech-
anistic basis for their emergence. Specifically, we con-
sider self-recognition, the emergence of the concept of
“I/Me”, and the emergence of an organism’s awareness
of being self-aware. This last phenomenon in particular
has been the subject of intense philosophical and theolog-
ical debate over the centuries [1]. In Section IV, we con-
sider aspects of self-awareness that are apparently unique
to humans, namely various existential and religious con-
cepts such as the mind and soul, solipsism, the idea that
reality is an illusion, and various conceptions of divinity.
We also discuss the problem of tautologies that arises
when considering the various existential questions asso-
ciated with self-awareness, a problem that prevents an
unambiguous resolution of the problem of self-awareness
and the various associated existential issues. In Section
V, we discuss various experiments that could be used to
manipulate self-awareness, as well as test some of the
hypotheses presented here. Furthermore, we speculate
on how certain kinds of metaphysical constructs, such
as mind-body separation and the delocalization of mind
in several bodies, may in principle be physically realiz-
able. We conclude with a brief discussion of a number of
additional issues related to self-awareness and computa-
tional neuroscience, such as the role of mirror neurons,
other forms of awareness, the concept of qualia, and the
role that set and logic theory could play in understanding
various neural structures associated with higher cognitive
functions in complex organisms.
II. SELF-AWARENESS AS A LEARNED
BEHAVIOR
All sufficiently complex terrestrial life has a brain
which processes the sensory input obtained by the organ-
ism’s sensory organs. The five senses familiar to humans
are sight, hearing, touch, taste, and smell. In addition
to these basic senses, which provide the organismal brain
with external information about the world, neural con-
nections throughout the body provide the brain with in-
formation about various parts of the body in which it sits
[12].
A seemingly obvious point to note is that the organ-
ism’s brain sits inside the organism’s head, and that the
organism’s various sensory organs and internal sensory
connections are located in specific parts of the body,
which are wired to the organism’s brain in a specific way.
Therefore, the organism’s brain is obtaining information
about the world from a specific vantage point. This van-
tage point is such that the flow of information from the
environment always contains a constant subset of infor-
mation related to the organism. Using humans as an
example, the human brain constantly receives visual in-
formation from the human in which it sits. This visual
information consists of various parts of the human or-
ganism’s body, such as hands, arms, tip of the nose, feet,
legs, torso, etc. It should be emphasized that, from the
perspective of the brain, the environmental inputs also
include the “internal” sensory inputs, since these provide
information about certain aspects of the material world,
in this case coming from the organism itself.
Since this subset of “self-information” is constant, the
organism’s brain can re-wire itself in response to this in-
formation flow, until neural pathways are formed that
respond to stimuli connected to the organism. The end
result of this “self-learning” process is the formation of
neural pathways that respond to inputs related to the or-
ganism, and therefore recognize the organism. The neu-
ral pathways are said to then store a kind of “self-image”
that is associated with the organism. Inputs that are
related to this self-image then trigger the relevant neu-
ral pathways, resulting in self-recognition. Given that it
is believed that neural pathway formation is driven by
a reward-punishment-based selection process, we argue
that the emergence of an organismal “self-image” should
be a self-reinforcing process that automatically extracts
the subset of information flow associated with the organ-
ism itself.
It makes sense that self-awareness should be processed
in regions of the brain that integrate many different
sources of input together. First of all, such a region
of the brain will have a stronger total signal strength
connected to the organism. Furthermore, since the
different sources of external inputs carry different as-
pects of information about the organism, these respec-
tive aspects will all be strongly correlated with one an-
other. In an organism with a sufficiently powerful asso-
ciative memory and learning ability, these various self-
inputs will result in the formation of a highly correlated,
multi-dimensional “super-input.” Because sources of in-
put that derive from the environment, and not the organ-
ism, are constantly changing, the strength of the multi-
dimensional signal obtained from the organism becomes
proportionally stronger as the number of inputs that are
integrated together increases (in a rough analogy, the en-
vironmental inputs are like noise terms that are averaged
away as more and more sources of input are integrated
together).
It should be emphasized that the self-image is not nec-
essarily a well-defined set of neural pathways that repre-
sents a specific internal picture of the organism. Rather,
it should be thought more of as a set of associations gen-
erated by the continual input of information related to
3the organism itself. As will be seen later, these associ-
ations between various aspects of the organism provide
a mechanism for the organism to learn certain behaviors
that are associated with what is termed self-awareness.
In this vein, it should be noted that self-awareness has
previously been referred to as a “structure with varia-
tions” [12, 13].
Furthermore, while these associations are instantiated
by various neural connections, they do not consist exclu-
sively of associations of pathways that respond to sen-
sory inputs related to the organism. While such associ-
ations may provide a nucleus of pathways that form the
initial self-image, the formation of memories involving
the self-image may themselves become part of the self-
image, so that the number of associations defining the
self-image can increase in time (though presumably, the
size of the self-image saturates, since the brain contains
a finite number of neurons).
As an example, while an adult human organism looks
differently than it did as a child, it may nevertheless asso-
ciate a childhood picture with itself. This could conceiv-
ably occur in a variety of ways, which are not necessarily
mutually exclusive: (1) The picture is associated with
certain childhood memories, which were formed with the
organismal brain perceiving the world from a certain van-
tage point (due to the specific way that the brain re-
ceives sensory inputs from the environment). This van-
tage point is most closely associated with the vantage
point of the organismal brain in the adult body, which is
itself associated with the organismal self-image. (2) The
picture is associated with certain childhood memories,
which are associated with certain aspects of the child or-
ganism that are identical in the adult organism, which
are then associated with the organismal self-image. An
example is an organismal label such as a name.
Therefore, we argue that memory is crucial for the
emergence of self-awareness, since it allows for the for-
mation of neural pathways that can become associated
with the self-image, and therefore become part of the
self-image itself. Presumably, then, the larger the mem-
ory capacity of an organismal brain, the larger and more
complex the self-image that can be formed, and hence the
“higher” the level of self-awareness that can be achieved.
The arguments presented here suggest that self-
awareness should emerge in slowly replicating organisms.
For slowly replicating organisms, there is a strong selec-
tion pressure to adopt a big-brained survival strategy, in
order to ensure organismal survival to allow for reproduc-
tion. Large brained organisms are likely under selection
pressures to evolve a brain topology that allows for the
integration of many different sources of input together.
This ensures that the brain operates as a unit, and not
as several independent modules that can possibly engage
in contradictory behaviors and thereby adversely affect
fitness. In addition, an integrated brain topology allows
for the co-processing of many different sources of infor-
mation, which presumably leads to an improved ability
to choose an optimal survival strategy.
The emergence of an integrated neural topology there-
fore parallels integration processes seen in the emergence
of other complex systems, such as multicellular organ-
isms and networked societies. In general, systems that
evolve collective replicative strategies will be under se-
lection pressures to integrate and coordinate the actions
of their various component parts, since a system that
behaves as a single entity will likely have a significant
survival advantage over systems in which the components
function independently and do not communicate with one
another.
It should be emphasized that the idea of external and
internal sensory inputs driving the emergence of self-
awareness has been previously considered by a number
of authors [12, 14]. Indeed, we believe that many of the
arguments that are made in this paper have been already
presented in [12]. Nevertheless, we believe that this pa-
per differs from previous works on the subject in that
it specifically identifies associative learning as the under-
lying mechanistic basis for the emergence of the various
behaviors defining self-awareness. Therefore, the discus-
sion in this paper might provide a more useful framework
for understanding the evolution of self-awareness, and for
facilitating the construction of machines that can exhibit
self-aware behaviors.
III. THE EMERGENCE OF THREE “CLASSIC”
ASPECTS OF SELF-AWARENESS
In this section, we speculate on the emergence of three
“classic” aspects of self-awareness: (1) Self-recognition
in the mirror. (2) The concept of “I” or “Me”. (3) The
phenomenon whereby an organism is aware of being self-
aware.
A. Self-recognition in the mirror
One of the standard tests for determining whether an
organism is self-aware is to see if it recognizes itself when
placed in front of a mirror. Thus far, only humans, the
great apes, dolphins, and, more recently, elephants, have
been shown to exhibit self-recognition. Other animals
simply ignore the image, or see it as a rival organism
[2–4].
If an organism has a brain that is capable of forming a
self-image, as described above, then, when the organism
sees its reflection in the mirror, various aspects of that
reflection will trigger stimulation of the neural pathways
containing the self-image. The result is that the organism
recognizes the reflection in the mirror, and associates it
with the various self-inputs that produced the self-image
in the first place. Therefore, if, as is done in a number
of self-recognition experiments, an “X” is painted on the
organism’s forehead [4], a sufficiently intelligent organ-
ism will understand that the image in the mirror will be
seen touching the “X” if the organism touches the region
4of the body that the location of the “X” most closely
corresponds to in the self-image, i.e. the forehead (this
presumably supposes that the organism has an idea of
what a mirror does, otherwise the organism might try to
touch the “X” of the reflection).
While the paragraph above provides a general
framework for understanding the phenomenon of self-
recognition, it is still useful to discuss in further detail the
various ways by which the organismal brain can associate
the image in the mirror with the organismal self-image,
and thereby make the reflection a part of the self-image.
If the organism moves a certain body part, say an arm,
in front of the mirror, it may notice a correlation be-
tween the motion of the reflected body part and its own
body part. The result is that the reflected body part
becomes associated with the actual body part. Further-
more, the organism may notice that the reflected body
part is connected to the body of another organism, so
that the moving body part in the reflection is associated
with the entire body in the reflection. If the organism
has an ability to perceive spatial relations, then, since
the reflected body part may be mapped onto the actual
body part with a certain transformation, the organismal
brain might instinctively apply the same transformation
to the rest of the body in the image, which would result
in the body in the reflection becoming associated with
the organism’s actual body. The end result of this is
that the reflection in the mirror becomes associated with
the organism’s self-image. Indeed, the ability to perceive
spatial relations and to instinctively apply spatial trans-
formations is likely necessary for an organism to use the
information from its reflection in order to coordinate its
movements and successfully touch the “X” on its fore-
head.
It should be noted that these arguments assume that
it is the organism’s actual body parts, and not the re-
flected body parts, that are directly associated with the
organism’s self-image. This implies that the organism is
able to distinguish between the reflection of a given body
part and the body part itself. However, this does not yet
resolve the issue, since the organism has to not only be
able to distinguish a body part from its reflection, but be
able to recognize which of the two is associated with its
self-image.
There are various ways in which the organism can dis-
tinguish its actual body part from the one in the reflec-
tion as belonging to the organismal self-image. First of
all, the actual body part is distinguished from the body
part in the reflection in that, in addition to being visually
observed, also provides information about itself to the
organismal brain via direct neural connections (a person
can “feel” their own arm, for instance). However, this
additional information can only allow the organism to
distinguish between its actual body part and the reflec-
tion if the organism can correlate these internal inputs
from the given body part with the spatial location of
the body part. This implies that the organismal brain is
wired to recognize the various internal inputs as originat-
ing from different regions of the body, and to coordinate
its movements accordingly. Whether this ability is genet-
ically pre-programmed or is learned is unclear. However,
it is should be noted that organisms that are not capa-
ble of self-recognition in the mirror, such as dogs, are
able to scratch an itch. This behavior is even possible
with one’s eyes closed. Therefore, there is clearly some
non-trivial coordination of body movements with various
sensory inputs, the exact mechanism of which is likely an
important area of research.
Secondly, even without internal sensory input, the or-
ganism’s actual body part, say an arm, is perceived by
the organismal brain from a specific vantage point, as
defined by the location of the organism’s various sensory
organs, say the eyes, in relation to the body part. There-
fore, the actual body part and the reflected body part
are perceived differently. Because the actual body part,
with its associated vantage point, is the one that is actu-
ally with the organism at all times, and is the one that
is used by the organism for its various tasks, it is the
actual body part that becomes directly associated with
the organismal self-image. Of course, internal sensory in-
put strengthens the association between the actual body
part and the organismal self-image, since it provides ad-
ditional information that allows the organismal brain to
more sharply distinguish what inputs are always present
and correlated with the organism performing its various
tasks.
As with visual self-recognition, voice recognition also
emerges via an associative process. The motion of the
organism’s mouth and the vibrations of the vocal cords
produces a sound. This sound is therefore correlated with
the organism’s mouth and vocal cords, or, more precisely,
with the mouth and vocal cords that are associated with
the organism’s self-image. Therefore, the sound corre-
lated with the mouth and vocal cords associated with the
organism’s self-image itself becomes associated with, and
therefore a part of, the organism’s self-image. Therefore,
the organismal brain can learn to recognize the sound of
the voice generated by the organism.
B. The concept of “I/Me”
With the emergence of language, an organism capa-
ble of self-awareness is able to express its self-awareness
via the concepts of “I” or “Me”. Specifically, these self-
referential terms become associated with the self-image
formed inside the organism’s brain, and therefore with
the self-inputs that produced the self-image, and, in the
case of self-recognition in the mirror, with the organism’s
reflection. Therefore, as with memory, the emergence of
language allows for the formation of new sets of neural
pathways that are associated with, and become a part of,
the organismal self-image.
To understand the emergence of “I/Me” in self-aware
organisms, we must first develop a canonical definition
of these terms, one that does not rely on the concept of
5self-awareness. We do this via the following example:
Suppose that an organism feels hunger, notices that
another organism has food, and communicates the desire
to obtain food from the other organism. If there are other
organisms around, then the organism desiring food must
communicate that it is the organism that desires food,
and not some other organism. One way that this can
be accomplished is if every organism has a label. By us-
ing the appropriate label, say, “Sam,” the organism can
communicate that it seeks to obtain food from the other
organism, e.g. via the command “Give Sam food”. In
this case, “Give Sam food” is associated with the organ-
ism eating the food, which is associated with the various
aspects involved in eating the food connected to the or-
ganism (placing the food in the mouth, grasping it with
the hands, etc.).
Therefore, because the various aspects of the organism
are associated with the self-image, “Give Sam food” is as-
sociated with the self-image as well. Eventually, because
the label “Sam” is used in a variety of other contexts,
the label “Sam” becomes associated with the organism’s
self-image, and therefore with the various aspects of the
organism that led to the formation of the self-image.
Now, the system of using organism-specific labels in
inter-organism communication can be quite cumbersome,
since it requires storing a list of the various labels in the
population and the specific organisms to which they refer.
For a small population, this might not be a problem.
However, for a large, dynamic population, maintaining a
long list of labels can be highly inefficient.
As a solution to this problem, one can use canonical,
temporary labels during inter-organism communication.
The organism transmitting the information is assigned
the temporary label “I” or “Me”, depending on the con-
text (or “We/Us” when speaking for a collective), while
the organism receiving information is assigned the tem-
porary label “You”. Organisms not involved in the given
communication may be assigned generic labels such as
“He”, “She”, etc.
There is a slight ambiguity with this definition, be-
cause, if two organisms happen to speak simultaneously,
then both are transmitting information, and both are
receiving information, so that the terms “I” and “You”
can refer to either organism. To resolve this issue,
we define an inter-organismal communication to not
only include the message itself, but to also include the
organism transmitting the message, and the organism
receiving the message. Expressed mathematically, this
means that an inter-organism communication is defined
by the ordered triplet (Organism
1
,Organism
2
,Message),
where Organism
1
is the organism transmitting the
information, Organism
2
is receiving the informa-
tion, and Message is the actual message transmitted.
The words “I” and “You” in Message then refer to
Organism
1
and Organism
2
, respectively. Note then
that this definition of an inter-organismal communica-
tion resolves the amibguity, because when Organism
1
speaks to Organism
2
, the inter-organismal communica-
tion is given by, (Organism
1
,Organism
2
,Message),
while when Organism
2
speaks to Organism
1
,
the inter-organismal communication is given by,
(Organism
2
,Organism
1
,Message). It is interesting
to note that this definition allows us to formally
define “I” and “You” for an organism speaking to
itself, since such a communication is denoted by
(Organism,Organism,Message), and so “I” can refer to
the organism in the first slot, and “You” can refer to the
organism in the second slot.
Within this system, an organism expressing a desire
for food from another organism can say “Give me food,”
without needing to use a specific label. This has the ad-
vantage that the organism receiving the information un-
derstands that the food is meant to go to the organism
transmitting the information, and does not require addi-
tional information that associates a label with the organ-
ism. Then, following a similar argument to the previous
one based on label-specific communication, it is possi-
ble to see that the terms “I/Me” become associated with
the organism’s self-image and the various aspects of the
organism that led to the formation of the self-image.
As with the phenomenon of self-recognition in the mir-
ror, the phenomenon of “I/Me” requires some further de-
velopment beyond the basic mechanistic framework out-
lined here. The main issue is that, when an organism
feels hungry and decides to communicate that it desires
food, it must know that the organism that is hungry is
the same as the organism that is communicating.
When an organism feels hungry, it is pre-programmed
to obtain and eat food. As a result, the sensation of
hunger and the act of obtaining food become associated
with the various parts of the organism that are involved
with eating the food (the hands, mouth, etc.). Since
these parts of the organism are a part of the organismal
self-image, the organismal brain can learn, through a pro-
cess of associative learning, that the process of obtaining
food and satisfying an appetite is accomplished by feed-
ing the organism associated with the self-image. There-
fore, when the hungry organism wants to communicate
that it wants food from another organism, the organismal
brain knows that it must use a label that corresponds to
the organismal self-image.
Now, when the hungry organism is about to commu-
nicate that it wants food from another organism, certain
neural pathways are activated that, while they do not di-
rectly correspond to the organism speaking, they contain
relevant information that is then subsequently sent to
the neural pathways controlling the vocal cords for com-
munication. Since these neural pathways are associated
with the organism moving its mouth and speaking, and
since the organism’s mouth is associated with the organ-
ism eating food and hunger, then the organism doing the
speaking is associated with the hungry organism desiring
food. Therefore, the organism doing the speaking is the
same as the organism desiring food, and so the organis-
mal brain knows that providing the speaking organism
with food will automatically provide the hungry organ-
6ism with food. This of course implies that the organism
should use the canonical labels “I” or “Me”.
Another set of concepts related to “I” or “Me” are the
various concepts of possession, such as “my” and “mine”.
An expression such as “my hand,” for example, is meant
to denote the hand that is associated with the organism
that is speaking.
The concept of “myself” is more subtle: “Self” is a gen-
eral term that refers to a set of behaviors characterizing
“sentient” beings as distinct from non-“sentient” beings.
The term, “Myself” is therefore meant to refer to the set
of “sentient” behaviors associated with the organism that
is speaking. This is a subtle point that will be further
discussed in the following section.
While the concepts of “I/Me” may be defined without
reference to self-awareness per se, it is nevertheless an
issue as to whether self-awareness is required in order for
an organism to learn to properly apply these concepts.
For example, one way that an organism can learn to use
the concept of “I/Me” is to observe other organisms. Ini-
tially, an organism might conclude that “I/Me” is a label
that refers to a given organism, until it notices that many
organisms use this label, and that an organism with the
label “I/Me” in one context has the label “You” in an-
other context. After extensive observation, an organism
with sufficient powers of abstraction and association may
conclude that “I/Me” refers to the organism transmitting
the information. Following a similar line of reasoning to
the one described in connection with obtaining food, it
is then possible to see that an organism that has learned
the concept of “I/Me” will, via mediation of the associa-
tions defining the self-image, be able to use these terms
appropriately.
C. Awareness of self-awareness
Another phenomenon associated with self-aware or-
ganisms is something that can be referred to as “aware-
ness of self-awareness”. Whether other animals experi-
ence this phenomenon is unclear. However, humans are
known to wonder why they are the way they are, that is,
why they have the body and the mind that they have,
and why they could not be someone else.
The question as to why a person is the way they are
is not a scientific one, since, as a biochemical machine,
a person’s identity is defined by their physical make-
up. Such a question therefore belongs in the realm of
metaphysics or theology. Indeed, awareness of one’s self-
awareness has been one of the central paradoxes of human
existence. It has been a central focus in nearly every ma-
jor religion and philosophy. It is intimately connected
with the mind-body problem and the concept of a meta-
physical “soul” [1].
It may therefore seem strange that a biochemical ma-
chine should develop questions that, from a scientific
point of view, do not make sense and are therefore unan-
swerable. However, if we view the emergence of self-
awareness as a consequence of associative memory and
learning in a sufficiently complex brain, then we can ra-
tionally speculate on the emergence of this phenomenon.
A self-aware organism develops an internal “self-
image” that causes it to recognize itself in the mirror,
and behave in other ways that are associated with self-
awareness. However, such a self-aware organism does
not exist in isolation, but rather in a community with
other organisms. Taking humans as an example, then
presumably, when one human looks at another, the sec-
ond human is sufficiently similar to first human that the
sensory input from the second human is associated with,
and therefore stimulates, the self-image in the brain of
the first human. However, the second human and the
first human are not the same, and therefore the sensory
input from the second human is recognized as similar to,
and yet simultaneously different from, the sensory input
that led to the formation of the first human’s self-image.
In an organism with a natural curiousity, the internal
contradiction of having a sensory input that stimulates
the internal self-image of an organism, and yet is not de-
rived from the organism, may cause the organism to view
its existing self-image as arbitrary, and to wonder why it
has the self-image that it does (since in a sense, the stim-
ulation of its self-image by another organism corresponds
to an effective, temporary replacement of its existing self-
image with the image of another organism).
Another manifestation of the phenomenon of aware-
ness of self-awareness is the fact that self-aware organisms
can deduce the concept of self-awareness. Presumably,
this emerges because a sufficiently intelligent organism
is capable of creating complex associations that define
fairly abstract concepts. Therefore, an organism, by ob-
serving itself, perhaps other organisms, and other physi-
cal objects, may deduce the general concept of a physical
object. Essentially, the organism associates various phys-
ical objects with one another, and this association is what
defines an abstract concept called “physical object”.
However, a sufficiently intelligent organism will be able
to note that not all physical objects, defined as inputs
that activate the set of neural pathways that store the
concept of a general object, are the same. That is, two
physical objects may stimulate a general set of “physical
object”-recognizing pathways, and two additional sets of
pathways, each corresponding to the unique features of
each object. Therefore, a sufficiently intelligent organism
may notice that the organism corresponding to its self-
image, as well as other self-aware organisms, are physical
objects, and yet they are physical objects that behave in
a manner different from other objects, such as a tree, or
a rock, for instance. Therefore, a sufficiently intelligent
organism may attempt to develop a concept that char-
acterizes the set of behaviors that distinguishes between
self-aware organisms and other physical objects. If the
organism first develops a general concept describing be-
havior whereby an organism seems to focus its attention
on some other physical object, then such an organism
might develop the concept of “aware”.
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tice that some aware organisms may not be able to ex-
hibit certain behaviors, such as self-recognition in the
mirror. This set of behaviors that distinguishes self-aware
organisms from other organisms may be attributed to a
property, called “the self”, that self-aware organisms pos-
sess. Since self-recognition in the mirror is a set of be-
haviors that can be observed to be a form of awareness, a
sufficiently intelligent organismmay attempt to refine the
concept of “awareness” to describe this particular set of
behaviors. If the organism is itself self-aware, then the or-
ganismal brain may notice that the organism associated
with the internal self-image is aware of the organism asso-
ciated with the internal self-image, and therefore engages
in a set of behaviors defining a “self”. In order to express
this observation in language, the organism may conclude
that it is “myself-aware”. Since other organisms may be
observed to exhibit behavior that is consistent with the
behavior of the organism associated with the self-image,
the organism may be able to conclude that other organ-
isms are “myself-aware”. Eventually, since the “my” is
redundant in a certain sense, the generic term that could
emerge is simply “self-awareness”, though strictly speak-
ing, one could define and distinguish between concepts
such as “myself-awareness” and “yourself-awareness”.
IV. EXISTENTIAL AND RELIGIOUS
CONCEPTS ASSOCIATED WITH
SELF-AWARENESS
In this section, we discuss a number of aspects of self-
awareness that are apparently unique to humans. In
particular, we show how the mechanisms of associative
memory and learning, combined with language, can fa-
cilitate the emergence of various existential and religious
concepts associated with self-awareness. Furthermore,
we show how tautologies invariably emerge when dis-
cussing existential and religious issues associated with
self-awareness, which prevent an unambiguous resolution
to these various issues.
If these speculations prove to be largely correct, then
it suggests that the various existential and religious ques-
tions attributed to self-awareness in humans may not be
intrinsically unique to humans. That is, other organismal
lines could themselves evolve to a sufficiently high level
of intelligence that they would exhibit similar behaviors.
Furthermore, it suggests that it is in principle possible to
construct self-aware machines (though, due to the tau-
tologies that emerge, this will always be an issue open
for debate).
A. The concepts of “I am” and “I exist”
The statements “I am” or “I exist” have been regarded
as key signatures of self-awareness. However, since “I
am” and “I exist” are similar statements, we will focus
our attention on the statement “I am.”
The emergence of the concept of “I” and its associ-
ation with the organismal self-image has already been
discussed. Therefore, we must next turn our attention to
the concept of “am,” which is the present tense conjuga-
tion of the verb “to be.”
The verb “to be” is used to convey information regard-
ing the state of an object, e.g. “The car is in Atlanta.” It
should be noted, however, that in the present tense, the
verb “to be” is superfluous. That is, the statement “The
car in Atlanta” clearly conveys the state (in this case po-
sitional) information of the car. Indeed, some languages,
such as Russian and Hebrew, do not have a present tense
conjugation of the verb “to be.” Therefore, in such lan-
guages, the equivalent of the statement “The car is in
Atlanta” would exactly be ”The car in Atlanta.”
When we incorporate the concept of time, however,
then the verb “to be” becomes necessary, in order to
assign a temporal label to the state information. One la-
bel can be used to indicate past state information, while
another label can be used to indicate future positional
information. Therefore, the statement, “The car was in
Atlanta,” indicates that a given car was located in At-
lanta at some undefined point in the past, while the state-
ment “The car will be in Atlanta,” indicates that a given
car will be located in Atlanta at some undefined point in
the future (in the English language, these statements do
not necessarily preclude the car being in Atlanta in the
present. Different languages have different subtle varia-
tions in tenses to handle various cases).
Note that the words “was” and “will be” are not su-
perfluous in their respective sentences. They convey ad-
ditional temporal information that “The car in Atlanta”
does not. Indeed, even languages such as Russian and
Hebrew, which do not have a present tense conjugation
of the verb “to be,” exactly use this verb to convey both
past and future state information. Therefore, in Russian
and Hebrew, the equivalent to the statement, “The car
was in Atlanta” is exactly “The car was in Atlanta.”
The present tense conjugation of the verb “to be” could
then emerge to fill the gap between the past and the
future tenses of the verb. That is, other verbs, such as
“to throw, to eat, to sleep, to walk, etc.” require present
tense conjugations.
From this mechanistic perspective, the statement “I
am” is seen to be a tautology, that is, true by definition.
The term “I” refers to the organism that is speaking the
“I”, and hence the organism’s self-image, and “am” has
no intrinsic meaning except in the context of referring to
the state of an object.
Similarly, the statement “I exist” is also a tautology.
To say that an object exists is to state that it is a con-
struct of the physical universe. Since “I” refers to a self-
image that was produced by various inputs associated
with a given organism, “I” refers to a construct of the
physical universe, and therefore, “I exist” is true by def-
inition.
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Another set of related concepts that emerge in suffi-
ciently intelligent organisms are the concepts of “mind”,
“soul”, and “self”. As hinted at previously, the emer-
gence of these concepts require an organism to associate
contradictory constructs with organisms that it observes,
including the organism that is associated with the self-
image (i.e., the organism itself).
Specifically, a sufficiently intelligent brain may develop
the general concept of a physical object, with which it
associates other organisms, as well as the organism asso-
ciated with the self-image. At the same time, the suffi-
ciently intelligent brain may notice that different physical
objects exhibit different behaviors, so that certain physi-
cal objects, such as humans, apes, and elephants, say, are
recognized as distinct from other objects, such as rocks
and trees. The result is that the set of behaviors dis-
tinguishing one set of physical objects from another may
provide the basis for defining a new concept.
In the context of self-aware organisms, the set of behav-
iors distinguishing such organisms from non-self-aware
organisms may collectively be used to define a concept,
which may be termed the “mind”, “soul”, or “self”. Be-
cause such concepts describe a set of behaviors not shared
by all physical objects, these related concepts become en-
tities that are distinct from physical objects. Therefore,
the notion of “mind”, “soul”, and “self” may become re-
garded as entities that are associated with self-aware or-
ganisms, but are simultaneously distinct from the physi-
cal make-up of the organisms themselves.
Various religions have then developed differing spec-
ulations as to the relation between the “soul” and the
physical organism. Some religious traditions argue that
the “soul” is intrinsically tied to the physical organism,
and the destruction of the physical organism leads to the
destruction of the “soul”. Other traditions argue that
when an organism with a “soul” dies, the physical make-
up of the organism is destroyed, but the “soul” is pre-
served [15]. To understand the basis for such a view, we
note that if an organism dies by being killed, this gener-
ally involves some other external physical object affecting
the organism in a way that causes it to cease function-
ing. However, since the external physical object can af-
fect other objects that do not have a “soul” (a bullet can
put holes in both living tissue and in rocks, for example),
one conclusion that can be drawn is that these external
physical objects can only afffect the physical aspect of
an organism, but that the set of behaviors defining the
“soul” are unaffected.
Such a view is likely reinforced by the innate fear of
death. The fear of death can trigger an internal stress re-
sponse inside the organismal brain, which drives the for-
mation of neural pathways that can suppress this stress
response. Since a dead organism is recognized as being
a physical object that appears similar to the organism
when it was alive, the fear of death, in a sufficiently in-
telligent organism, may lead to a stress response that
causes the organism to attempt to preserve the set of be-
haviors characterizing the “soul”. The conclusion that
death only affects the physical aspect of the organism,
but the non-physical “soul” is preserved, defines a set
of neural pathways that suppress the internal stress re-
sponse in the organismal brain. Because this conclusion
is an internally consistent one, it does not lead to any
contradictions in the organismal brain that can lead to
an “un-wiring” of the neural pathways.
Note that the existence of a mind, a metaphysical soul,
and the self is true by definition. As with the concepts of
“I am”/“I exist”, these concepts are tautologies by the
nature in which they were constructed. Furthermore, the
various interpretations associated with these concepts are
also tautologies. The reason is that all of the concepts
developed here, as well as the various interpretations,
were developed by developing distinct sets of concepts to
describe a certain class of organisms (the recognized self-
aware ones). Since these concepts are generated by such
organisms, they are intrinsically associated with one an-
other, and therefore it is not a scientific question to spec-
ulate as to whether these concepts can exist separately
from one another.
C. Solipsism
With the concepts of “mind”, “soul”, and “self” in
hand, we can now proceed to speculate about several
other behaviors that are associated with sufficiently in-
telligent self-aware organisms. These behaviors are con-
nected to the idea that reality is, in some sense, an illu-
sion.
One such behavior is known as solipsism, and essen-
tially means “myself alone”. In the solipsistic perspec-
tive, a given organism is the only self-aware being in the
universe. Furthermore, as far as that organism is con-
cerned, the universe only exists as long as that organism
is there to observe it.
To understand how an organismal brain may develop
such a conclusion, we need to first analyze various kinds
of associations that the brain forms. To begin, when
the brain receives sensory information from the external
universe, it receives information about the organism in
which it sits, as well as information from the environ-
ment (strictly speaking, from the point of view of the
organismal brain, all signals may be viewed as “environ-
mental” signals). Furthermore, if the organism has a
long-term memory that can be stimulated, then the or-
ganismal brain can have simultaneous activation of var-
ious neural pathways that correspond to all the various
aspects of universe that the organism has encountered in
its lifetime. Such activated neural pathways can become
associated with one another, which can then be used to
define a neural pathway that is a representation of the
general concept of reality. However, as a result of the
associations formed, the organismal self-image is a part
of the associations defining the physical reality. There-
9fore, the organismal brain associates its self-image with
the external world.
The existence of sleep and death, however, complicates
the association between the organismal self-image and
the rest of the physical universe, in such a way that it
results in a number of equally valid associations, in the
sense that none of them may be proven true or false.
To understand this, consider the following thought
experiment: A human observes the motion of the sun
through the sky, and eventually forms in its long-term
memory a set of associations that corresponds to this
motion. Now, suppose the organism observes the sun
at some position in the sky, and then decides to take a
nap. The organism may form a memory of the sun at
some given position in the sky, as well as a memory of
the organism lying down, and closing its eyes. Once the
organism falls asleep, its next set of memories will be of
it opening its eyes, getting up and feeling groggy, and
noticing that the sun is at some new position in the sky.
Therefore, the organism forms a memory of the sun
in one position in the sky, and then in another position.
Although the organism does not have a memory of the
continuous motion of the sun in this particular instance,
previous experience may cause the organism to “fill the
gap” and to infer that the sun was moving through the
sky, and the lack of this memory is associated with the
various features of the organism going to sleep that the
organism remembers (closing the eyes, lying down, feel-
ing groggy, etc.). However, although the organism may
infer that the sun should have been in a continuum of
positions as it moved through the sky, the organism has
no memory of this series of events, nor of itself in the in-
stances when these events occurred. Since the organism
associates its self-image with the external reality, there is
an apparent contradiction in a series of memories of the
physical reality that do not involve the organism. There-
fore, since the organism does not have a memory of itself
during the intervening positions of the sun, the organism
may conclude that there was no external reality either
during the time it was asleep.
As a result, the principle of “correlation implies causa-
tion”, combined with the association between the organ-
ismal self-image and the external reality, may cause the
organism to conclude that the physical world only exists
when the organism is there to observe it. Equivalently,
the organism may conclude that it creates the physical
world, including all the other organisms in it.
A similar argument can be achieved by considering
death, although it is somewhat complicated by the fact
that an organism cannot observe its own death. In this
case, the organism must observe that other organisms
die, and infer that it too will die. By noticing that other
organisms that are dead cannot observe the universe, the
organism may infer that it too cannot observe the uni-
verse either when dead, which may also lead to a solip-
sistic view.
D. The idea that thought creates the physical
world
Another notion related to solipsism is the idea that
thought itself creates the physical world. Such a view
also has a number of forms, but emerges as an attempt
to explain the apparent contradiction in the solipsistic
view that, on the one hand, a given organism creates the
physical world, and yet at the same time is a physical
being as well.
This apparent contradiction may be resolved by view-
ing the organism itself as a part of the physical world,
that exists only when the organism is there to observe it.
But this is a problem, for if the organism is not there in
the first place, then it cannot observe and create itself.
However, by the construction of such concepts as the
“mind”, “soul”, and “self”, the organism can make a sep-
aration between the so-called physical aspects of the or-
ganism, and the set of behaviors that define a new ab-
stract, metaphysical concept. The idea in this case is that
the physical aspects of the organism are indeed a part of
the external reality, which only exists if the metaphysi-
cal aspects are there to observe it. However, because the
metaphysical aspects are not associated with the physical
reality, they are not presumed to disappear when there
is no input from the sensory world. As a result, a logical
conclusion that follows is to accept the notion of “mind”
as a primitive, that exists independently of any external
reality. Because the organism opening its eyes leads to
observation of the world, and because the opening of the
eyes is associated with the set of behaviors defining a
metaphysical “mind”, the logical conclusion that follows
from this is that the universe is created by the “mind”
observing the world.
However, even here we have an apparent contradiction,
because observing the world involves the use of organs
that are associated with the physical universe. This is
resolved if the organism can be aware of itself thinking
as opposed to actually observing the world. Such a dis-
tinction should be possible because, during thought, cer-
tain constructs are formed via the stimulation of certain
neural pathways. However, during thought, these con-
structs are formed independently of any external stimuli,
so that certain neural pathways that are responsible for
interaction with the environment (muscles, sensory or-
gans, etc.), are inactivated. The result is that the process
of thought leads to a somewhat different set of associa-
tions than the process of actual observation and inter-
action with the environment. If the organismal brain
can translate this distinct set of neural constructs into
a word, i.e. “thought”, then the organismal brain may
note that “thought” involves the manipulation of repre-
sentations of physical constructs without interaction with
the environment itself. Since “thought” does not involve
explicit interaction with the environment, it is not di-
rectly associated with the physical reality. Furthermore,
since “thought” is associated with the “mind”, being a
member of the set of behaviors not characteristic of other
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physical objects, the organism may conclude that there
is an abstract “mind” that is capable of “thought” that
exists independently of any physical reality. However,
since “thought” involves representations of physical real-
ity, then the organism may conclude that the “mind” cre-
ates the physical world via “thought”. This is a more ab-
stract form of solipsism, but a form of solipsism nonethe-
less. As with previous concepts discussed in this section,
it is a view of physical reality that allows the organism
to “cheat” death, and so it is a view that is likely rein-
forced by the internal reward-punishment-based neural
pathway formation processes at work in the brain.
E. Reincarnation
Reincarnation is another common notion that humans
have developed. The origin of this idea comes from the
association of the organismal self-image with the external
reality. The solipsistic view argues that the organism cre-
ates the reality, and that reality itself is actually an illu-
sion. However, an organism may be uncomfortable with
this conclusion, since this implies that other other, sim-
ilar organisms are an illusion that the organism creates.
There may therefore appear to be something arbitrary
about the reality having been created from the vantage
point of an organism with a particular self-image.
One solution is to reject the notion that reality is an
illusion. The reality in fact exists independently of any
particular organism. However, since the organism views
the reality, as well as its self-image, from a certain van-
tage point, and since this vantage point is associated with
the reality, the organism may conclude that the vantage
point from which it views the reality is a generic one by
which the reality is viewed. If the reality does not dis-
appear when the organism dies, then all that changes is
the vantage point, so that the reality will be viewed from
the perspective of another organism. This is essentially
the content of reincarnation.
One version of reincarnation holds that there is only
one “mind” or “soul”, and that this entity is distributed
over many different organisms, in a kind of quantum su-
perposition. This view emerges because reality is viewed
from the perspective of a single organism, and hence from
a single “mind”. The other organisms in this reality, since
they are not the perspective from which the reality is be-
ing viewed, are then simply physical objects that do not
have a “mind” or “soul”. However, it may then seem
somewhat arbitrary that only the given organism has a
“mind”, and so one solution to this apparent contradic-
tion is that there is a single “mind” in the universe, and
so the reality can only be observed from the perspective
of one organism at a time. However, every organism has
an equal probability of being the vantage point of ob-
servation. This view is consistent with the many-worlds
interpretation of quantum mechanics: For every organ-
ism, there is a universe where the reality is viewed from
its perspective, and in that perspective, all other organ-
isms are simply biochemical machines.
F. The concept of divinity
The final religious concept we shall discuss is the con-
cept of divinity. The concept of divinity, especially the
monotheistic notion of a transcendent, all-powerful deity,
emerges by entirely disassociating the concept of “mind”
from the physical aspect of the organism. The idea is
that, because the “mind” is a nonphysical aspect of the
organism, then it must exist independently of the organ-
ism. However, unlike the previous discussion, the “mind”
does not need a physical instantiation in order to express
itself, but rather can exist and function fully indepen-
dently of any physical representation.
Furthermore, by noting that it is the “mind” aspects
of an organism that allows the organism to manipulate
other physical objects and create tools, the organism
might reason that the entire physical reality may have
been created by a “mind” entity that has no physical
form, since it itself creates the reality. In this view, since
humans are physical beings that engage in a set of be-
haviors that is indicative of possessing a “mind”, certain
religious views hold that humans were created in an im-
age, or likeness, of this transcendent, omnipotent “mind”.
In a sense, humans then contain a kind of projection of
this “mind,” that is of course far less powerful because it
is bound within a physical body.
As a final note, the concept of divinity as a single, tran-
scendent, omnipotent “mind” that creates the universe,
combined with the idea that there is one “mind” super-
posed over many organisms, and the idea that thought
creates the physical universe, may lead to the identifica-
tion of the single, superposed “mind” with the transcen-
dent “mind” that creates the universe, and therefore to
the conclusion that every human is an instantiation of
this transcendent “mind”. Indeed, in sufism, or Islamic
mysticism, there is a concept that each human is in a
sense God, that is, also divine [15]. This idea emerges
precisely from this set of identifications. Presumably,
other identifications could lead to other concepts.
G. Tautologies and the nature of reality
The list of the various religious and existential con-
cepts described above is not meant to be exhaustive, but
rather representative of various streams of modern reli-
gious thought. Note that all of these religious concepts
arise from the simultaneous association and disassocia-
tion of an organismal self-image with the external reality.
This leads to a variety of contradictory identifications,
and the attempt to resolve these contradictions leads to
a variety of additional concepts or constructs.
What must be noted is that all such concepts are tau-
tologies, that is, true by definition. Because all of these
concepts emerged from the way in which the organism’s
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sensory organs observe the organism and the external re-
ality, there is no way to either prove or disprove the va-
lidity of these constructs. In the language of set and logic
theory, one would say that these various existential and
religious questions are formally undecidable [16–18]. In-
deed, we argue that the various existential and religious
questions associated with self-awareness have remained
unresolved precisely because they are ultimately tautolo-
gies, and therefore unresolvable.
The fact that these various constructions are tautolo-
gies means that any explanation for the emergence of
self-awareness must deal with the possibility that the ex-
ternal reality is in fact a creation of the self-aware organ-
ism. This of course implies that an organism can never
fully establish that the explanation given for other organ-
isms’ self-awareness is an explanation that applies to the
organism itself. That is, self-awareness and conscious-
ness, and therefore the notion of a “mind” or “soul”,
may in one tautologically valid view, need to be taken
as primitives that have no explanation in terms of other
phenomena. This implies that we may then ask what is
the utility of attempting to provide a mechanistic expla-
nation for the emergence of self-awareness. To formulate
a proper answer to this question, we must first discuss
the general manner by which physical laws are deduced.
Physical laws are essentially compactified representa-
tions of an entire collection of physical phenomena. To
illustrate, Newton’s Second Law of Motion, F = ma may
be viewed as a compact way of describing a continuous
collection of phenomena, where each phenomenon is an
instantiation of a force acting on a mass that produces
an acceleration. Therefore, strictly speaking, it does not
make sense to ask whether physical laws are true or not,
in the sense that their usefulness comes not from any no-
tion of a higher truth, but rather whether or not they
provide a convenient framework for describing physical
phenomena, in a manner that facilitates the prediction
of the behavior of systems, and the construction of sys-
tems based on these behaviors.
Similarly, it does not make sense to ask whether the
speculations in this paper are true or not, for, as we have
shown, depending on how the various abstract concepts
are defined from a given set of behaviors, and how a
given question is framed, the speculations may be shown
to be either true or false. Rather, this paper has identi-
fied associative learning as the underlying mechanism for
the emergence of self-awareness in big-brained organisms.
The utility of this framework will not be its ability to re-
solve tautological issues such as the nature of the self, the
soul, or the mind, but rather whether this framework will
facilitate the development of predictive models for self-
awareness, including models for the evolutionary biology
of the phenomenon, and the development of machines
that can exhibit behaviors associated with self-awareness.
Ultimately, then, from a scientific perspective, it does
not matter whether there is an objective reality that
exists independently of the organism observing it, or
whether the reality is created by the organism itself. In
the former view, the objective reality is governed by phys-
ical laws that produced self-aware organisms capable of
manipulating the reality and deducing the physical laws
by which the reality is governed. In the latter view, the
solipsistic reality (the one created by the organism) is
also governed by physical laws that produced self-aware
organisms capable of manipulating the reality and de-
ducing the physical laws by which the illusory, solipsistic
reality is governed. Since these two views are both tauto-
logically valid, neither can be falsified by any kind of ex-
periment, and debates about the correctness of one view
over the other is relegated to the realm of philosophy (it
should be noted that we are referring to the philosophical,
existential notion of an “objective reality”, so that this
discussion does not deal with the so-called “measurement
problem” in quantum theory).
V. MANIPULATING SELF-AWARENESS
In this section, we speculate on several possible ways
to manipulate self-awareness. We emphasize that these
speculations should be viewed purely as thought experi-
ments, and not as suggestions for actual experiments on
big-brained organisms.
A. Sensory inhibition and mathematical modeling
One approach to test whether or not self-awareness
is a learned behavior that emerges from the formation
of a self-image is to see whether the emergence of self-
awareness can be controlled by regulating the sensory
inputs responsible for forming the self-image in the first
place. Essentially, by inhibiting the input of sensory in-
formation during the early stages of brain development,
when the neural pathways corresponding to the initial
nucleus of the self-image are being formed, it may be
possible to prevent the formation of the self-image. How-
ever, for a sufficiently complex organism, this may be
extremely difficult to accomplish in practice, because in
addition to the five senses, the number of internal sensory
inputs to the organismal brain may be so large that only
a drastic reduction in sensory information could severely
inhibit the formation of a self-image.
A related set of studies involves monitoring the de-
velopment of neural pathways corresponding to a self-
image in infant brains. Such studies could also be com-
plemented by mathematical modeling that, based on un-
derlying mechanisms for neural pathway formation, could
attempt to predict the various times at which various
general features of the self-image emerge. In this vein,
one interesting question is whether the formation of a
self-image involves a kind of percolation phase transi-
tion. That is, is self-awareness a gradually emergent
phenomenon, or is it characterized by the formation of
a critical nucleus of neural pathways defining a core self-
image? This core self-image would provide a threshold
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level of associations between various organismal features,
drastically facilitating the processing and integration of
further information related to the organism.
If self-awareness does involve a percolation-like tran-
sition of neural networks in the brain, then this should
manifest itself in terms of organismal behavior. For ex-
ample, humans are first capable of recognizing themselves
in the mirror at around 15 months of age [19]. Presum-
ably, at birth, the human baby’s brain is essentially a
“blank” that requires about 15 months to develop the
critical nucleus of neural pathways necessary for self-
recognition. If the phase transition picture is correct,
then the onset of self-recognition in the mirror will be
characterized by a binary switch behavior and will occur
suddenly.
B. Brain transplants
Another approach is to study what happens when the
brain of one organism is transplanted into another. If the
brain is transplanted at a sufficiently young age, before
the self-image has had a chance to form, then the brain
may be regarded as a “blank” that has not formed neu-
ral pathways that contain the imprint of the organism
in which it sits. Such a brain may therefore be trans-
planted into a new organism with little difficulty (not
including the actual surgical operations, of course, which
are a major difficulty), and the brain can form the self-
image based on the new organism in which it sits.
For an organismal brain that has already formed a self-
image, we conjecture that the result of the brain trans-
plant depends on the complexity of the organism. The
issue here is that the brain has already formed path-
ways corresponding to the neural imprint of a certain
organism. These neural pathways corresponding to the
self-image therefore respond to, and essentially “expect”
these inputs, in the sense that the absence of these inputs
can cause the neurons forming the pathways to begin a
re-wiring process in the search for inputs that they can
respond to. This in turn can cause the organismal brain
to trigger a stress response.
However, depending on the organism, the self-image
may be more robust to brain transplants in some organ-
isms than in others. Presumably, a sufficiently complex
organism may be capable of forming large sets of associ-
ations that correspond to various abstract concepts. The
result is that an organism such as a human may store
a more abstract form of the self-image than a simpler
organism, such as an elephant.
Therefore, a human brain may be transplanted with
relatively little difficulty. While the brain might ini-
tially experience a transient stress response, due to the
slightly different sensory information it is receiving, the
self-image may be stored in a sufficiently abstract form
that the brain may be able to adjust its internal wiring to
recognize the new organism in which it sits. We should
note that, by a more abstract form, we mean that the
self-image stores the general vantage point from which it
views the organism and the external reality, and recog-
nizes general features of the organism (such as an arm,
leg, etc.), without representing these features in great
detail.
A simpler organism, such as an elephant, may store
the self-image in a more literal manner. The result is
that when the brain of such an organism is transplanted,
it may be unable to respond to the inputs coming from
the new organism. The organism in which the trans-
planted brain sits may then seem extremely stressed and
confused, and may take a long time to reach normal be-
havior, if ever.
The additional advantage for a more complex organ-
ism, especially one that is capable of communicating via
language, is that it can know ahead of time that its brain
will be transplanted. The brain can therefore prepare
itself ahead of time, by forming temporary neural path-
ways that will allow for a smoother interface between
itself and the new organism in which it will sit. The ad-
vantage of language is that these neural pathways could
possibly be routed through the language centers of the
brain, which could provide a more abstract “emulation”
of the self-image that could facilitate integration into the
new body.
Of course, a simpler organism may, in any case, store a
less detailed self-image than the more complex organism,
suggesting that a simpler organism may actually have
an easier time adjusting to a brain transplant than a
more complex organism. Indeed, in organisms that are so
simple that their brains are not capable of forming a self-
image at all, brain transplants should have little effect on
organismal behavior. Clearly, there are competing effects
involved, which likely leads to some intermediate brain
complexity at which brain transplantation becomes most
difficult.
C. Brain-body separation
Another manipulation of self-awareness that we believe
will be possible is the physical analogue of mind-body
separation, what is more appropriately called brain-body
separation. The idea behind this concept is that it should
in principle be possible to remove the brain from an or-
ganism’s body in such a way that the behavior, and hence
self-awareness, of the organism is not affected at all.
Suppose the brain of a self-aware organism is extracted
from the organism, in such a way that all of the con-
nections between the brain and the rest of the body are
maintained, and suppose the brain is kept alive and func-
tional. Because the brain is still processing the external
and internal sensory information in the same manner as
before, the organism will still continue to function as nor-
mal, and the neural pathways defining the organismal
self-image will be unaffected. Essentially, the organism
continues to view the world from the same vantage point,
which might seem strange, since awareness is located in
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the brain, and yet the vantage point does not change
to one corresponding to the brain viewing the organism
from outside its body.
Now, suppose that the various inputs to the organis-
mal brain could be accomplished via some kind of wireless
connection, so that the organismal brain could be com-
pletely physically detached from the organism itself. In
this situation, the organismal brain would still be pro-
cessing the sensory information in the same manner, and
so again, the self-image would be unaffected and the or-
ganism would appear to function normally (though it
might be able to view its own brain).
What would be achieved in such a situation is liter-
ally brain-body separation. The organism could have its
brain kept alive and stored in some location, and kept in
contact with the organismal body via some kind of radio
frequency connection. Because the organismal brain is
receiving sensory information from the organism and the
external world from the same set of sensory organs, with
the relations among these inputs preserved, the organis-
mal self-image is unaffected by this brain-body separa-
tion, and the organism will still feel as if it is perceiving
the world and itself from the same perspective.
In this situation, if the organismal body is destroyed,
the brain-body connection will be destroyed as well, and
so the organism will be effectively dead. However, if a
brain-body connection is established with another organ-
ism without a brain-body connection, then the new or-
ganism will have the memories corresponding to the old
organism. In a sense, then, what would have been ac-
complished is a physical realization of the phenomenon
of reincarnation.
D. Multiple bodies in a single mind
What if two or more sets of organismal inputs were
fed into a single brain? It is very possible that the brain
would develop a kind of “composite” self-image corre-
sponding to the two set of bodies. Correlated behaviors
between the two bodies could emerge, even if the bod-
ies are spatially separated by vast distances. The light-
speed barrier to information transmission would, how-
ever, force a temporal separation to these correlated be-
haviors. However, we would have a mind that is super-
posed over multiple bodies. This mind could experience
spatial delocalization, in the sense that it could focus its
attention on some aspect of one organism, say looking at
one arm, and then switching its attention to focus on an
aspect of the other organism. The mind would essentially
feel like it was in several places at once.
E. Will it be possible to construct self-aware
machines?
The issue of whether it will be possible to construct
truly self-aware machines is composed of two questions:
The first question asks whether or not it will be possi-
ble to construct machines that exhibit the behaviors of
other self-aware organisms, such as humans. This ques-
tion is one within the realm of scientific investigation,
as it deals with physical constructs that may be ma-
nipulated. The second question asks whether such ma-
chines would be truly self-aware, i.e., would they have a
“soul”, or whether they would simply be imitations of
truly conscious life. As discussed in the subsection deal-
ing with tautologies, the answer to this question depends
on how one defines the various metaphysical constructs
of “mind” and “soul”, and is therefore not one that can
be ultimately resolved.
There are two possible approaches in designing ma-
chines capable of exhibiting self-aware behavior. One
approach involves enumerating the behaviors associated
with self-awareness, and explicitly programming this be-
havior into the machine. This approach is probably ex-
tremely difficult, because the list of behaviors is likely so
large that a direct enumeration of them would lead to
prohibitive memory and processor costs.
Another approach is to have the machine learn the be-
haviors based on a smaller set of rules acting on external
environmental inputs. This approach is more compact,
and also has the advantage that it allows the machine
to acquire new behaviors in response to varying environ-
mental inputs. Furthermore, because this approach is
likely more closely related to the manner in which hu-
mans respond to the external environment, it will likely
lead to machines that exhibit more human-like behavior.
Therefore, one can argue that it will indeed be possi-
ble to design self-aware machines. Indeed, machines that
are capable of some form of self-recognition have recently
been designed [20, 21]. Whether this implies that the ma-
chine has the beginnings of consciousness, a “mind”, or
a “soul”, or is merely imitating these phenomena, is ulti-
mately an unresolvable question. Indeed, one could argue
that something as simple as a self-replicating molecule is
capable of self-recognition, since it needs to catalyze its
own replication.
VI. FURTHER COMMENTS
In this section, we consider a number of additional top-
ics that are not directly related to the main points of this
paper. Nevertheless, because these topics deal with issues
that emerge naturally in a discussion of self-awareness,
they are worth discussing.
A. The role of mirror neurons
Mirror neurons are a recently discovered class of neu-
rons that are currently subjects of intense investigation
[22, 23], because they are believed to play a key role in or-
ganismal behaviors such as imitation and the emergence
14
of empathy [22, 23]. The mirror neurons are a set of neu-
rons that fire in response to a specific type of behavior,
whether that behavior occurs in the organism itself or in
another organism. Mirror neurons are named this way
because their firing causes the organism to imagine itself
engaging in the behavior of another organism, and so
they “reflect” a given behavior from one organism onto
another.
It can be seen that mirror neurons may also play a
key role in the emergence of self-awareness, since they
recognize various features of an organismal self-image.
However, what is not immediately clear is whether mirror
neurons are a special class of neurons, or whether they
belong to a more general class of neurons that can form
associative pathways, and simply happen to respond to
features associated with a given organism. If the latter is
the case, then self-awareness is not an emergent property
of a special class of “mirror neurons,” rather it is the
result of a set of associations that are implemented by a
general class of neurons, which are then termed “mirror
neurons” because they implement those associations.
To illustrate this point, consider a set of neurons that,
either individually or as part of a pathway, recognize eat-
ing behavior in an organism. These neurons will then fire
when the organism in which these neurons sit eats, but
then will also fire when the same organism sees another
eating. Therefore, one might argue that these neurons
were pre-set to recognize organismal behavior. However,
physiologically, they may be no different from neurons
that are involved in other conditional responses, for ex-
ample in the case of Pavlov’s famous series of experiments
with dogs.
B. Parental and other forms of awareness
The argument that self-awareness is fundamentally a
learned behavior faces a potential difficulty, in that be-
fore many self-aware organisms become self-aware, they
exhibit a form of awareness called “parental awareness,”
where the organism recognizes its parent, but does not
yet recognize itself [24]. Since recognizing another organ-
ism might seem like a more difficult task than recogniz-
ing oneself, it might seem that if self-awareness were a
learned behavior, then it should emerge before parental
awareness, and not after.
To resolve this issue, we begin by first noting that some
aspects of self-awareness must be hard-wired. That is,
the organismal brain must be pre-wired to recognize cer-
tain sensory connections as coming from certain parts
of the body, and to coordinate its various motions with
these sensory inputs. Otherwise, the organism will not
be able to form a self-image. Furthermore, the organism
must be pre-wired to engage in certain sets of behaviors
in response to certain inputs, so that these two can be-
come associated with one another to form a self-image.
As an illustration, an organism that is not pre-wired to
seek and eat food when hungry will not try to learn ver-
bal commands for obtaining food from another organism,
and will therefore not learn the concepts of “I/Me”.
Therefore, at some level, the organism must have a cer-
tain amount of “hard-wired” genetic programming that
leads to the construction of a brain that, given a cer-
tain set of inputs, is capable of processing those inputs
in a specific way and leads to certain forms of learned
behavior. As a side note, this implies that while some
manipulations of self-awareness are possible, others will
require a re-wiring of certain aspects of neural circuitry
to make the brain “compatible” with the new inputs the
brain receives as a result of the given manipulation.
However, because the genetic programming of an or-
ganism itself evolved through a long process of replicative
selection, it may be argued that the genetic programming
itself was “learned”. In this view, if we do not restrict
the definition of awareness to include behaviors that are
defined at the organismal level, but may also include “be-
haviors” that emerge at the cellular and even biochemical
levels, then one may view awareness as a “learned” be-
havior that emerges over long evolutionary time scales.
In general, there is no canonical definition for these
terms. A behavior is only learned with respect to some
pre-set rules that are hard-wired. Those hard-wired rules
may have themselves been “learned” with respect to some
other set of rules that are hard-wired on a lower level. In
principle, the chain can continue indefinitely, and so in
the final analysis, we have to start with something: Ei-
ther we postulate a set of hard-wired rules that, when
coupled to external interactions with the environment,
lead to a set of learned behaviors, or we take as our
primitive an ability to learn that, when coupled to the
environment, leads to the emergence of rules that then
may become hard-wired. The viewpoint to take largely
depends on considerations of convenience for the given
problem at hand. For example, when building a machine
to deal with various environmental inputs (say, a stress
response), the advantage of having responses hard-wired
is that the machine can respond more quickly to a given
set of inputs, and therefore has a higher probability of
behaving effectively (one would say that such a machine
has good “instincts”). On the other hand, such a machine
may not be able to effectively deal with new inputs. By
contrast, a machine that has to learn its responses may
be at an initial disadvantage, since it does not have a
pre-wired set of responses to a given situation. At the
same time, because the machine can learn its responses,
it can optimize its behavior for a given set of inputs.
In this view, we may understand the emergence of
parental awareness as preceding self-awareness in a num-
ber of ways: One possibility is that the organism is wired
with certain basic survival instincts. That is, the organ-
ism, even at birth, feels hunger and desires food. The
problem for a human baby, say, is that its other systems
have not “come online”, so that it is unable to perform
the activities that allow it to acquire food. To compen-
sate for this, the infant human is programmed with cer-
tain basic responses, such as crying, that are activated
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when the organism is hungry. Because the adult par-
ents are programmed to respond to these cries by feed-
ing the baby, the baby human’s brain learns to associate
the parent with various aspects of its own survival (ob-
taining food, etc.). As with the organismal self-image,
the result is the formation of a set of associations be-
tween the parent and the various basic pre-programmed
survival instincts in the baby’s brain, that leads to a
kind of “parental” self-image, leading to behavior that
may be termed “parental awareness”. However, because
the infant brain is not as developed as the adult brain,
“parental awareness” is likely represented in a much sim-
pler manner than self-awareness.
Eventually, as the baby grows and the brain begins to
take greater and more sophisticated control over the baby
organism’s body, the brain is able to process the external
and internal sensory information in a much more sophis-
ticated manner than before. Furthermore, as the organ-
ism learns to function more and more independently, the
organismal brain begins to adopt behaviors and survival
strategies that rely on the organism itself, and not on the
parent. The various pre-programmed instincts now lead
to organismal behaviors that lead to associations that
create a self-image, and the result is the emergence of
self-awareness.
C. The problem of qualia
One of the central issues that arise in attempts to un-
derstand the phenomena of self-awareness and conscious-
ness is the problem of qualia. Specifically, self-aware
organisms are seen to perceive the world using certain
primitives, called qualia, as the basic building blocks for
constructing reality (one of the most commonly cited ex-
amples of qualia is color, and probably the most com-
monly cited color is red, given the color’s comparatively
powerful affect on the brain) [25].
The existence of qualia raises the question as to why
the world is perceived with a given set of qualia, and not
others. That is, why is electromagnetic radiation per-
ceived in a manner that is called “color”, while air vibra-
tions are perceived in a manner that is called “sound”?
Furthermore, how is it possible to establish that the man-
ner by which reality perceived by one organism is the
same as the reality perceived by another organism?
Because qualia are primitives as perceived by a given
organism, they cannot be defined with respect to other
qualia percevied by the same organism or by similar
qualia perceived by different organisms. As discussed
previously, since science can only analyze interactions
between objects, and cannot tell us what an object ul-
timately “is” (a question that therefore does not make
sense, scientifically), the above questions, as with the ex-
istential questions discussed earlier, are ultimately unre-
solvable in a scientific sense.
While we cannot resolve the problem of qualia in a
scientific manner, we can nevertheless rationally specu-
late as to how a self-aware organism may formulate such
a problem in the first place. That is, while we cannot
define what color “is”, and therefore we cannot answer
whether or not two people perceive red in the same way,
we can attempt to resolve how such a question would
arise in the first place.
When an organism observes a color, say red, certain
neural pathways that recognize the color are stimulated.
An organism with a language ability may then formu-
late a word (“red”) to describe the color. More precisely,
the word “red” is instantiated in the organismal brain
by certain neural pathways involved in language, which
are associated with the neural pathways involved in vi-
sion and color recognition. However, because the word
“red” is itself constructed from letters, the neural path-
ways instantiating the word “red” are associated with
neural pathways that instantiate letters. Since letters
are not associated with the neural pathways instantiat-
ing the color red, the result is that the organismal brain
forms an internal contradiction, whereby the color red
is recognized as being associated with, and yet different
from, the word “red”. Since other qualia are recognized
as different from one another, and yet are associated with
one another via their association with letters, the organ-
ism may ask why it perceives a given qualia the way it
does, or more precisely, why the qualia are not all per-
ceived in the same manner (it should be noted that we
could reach a similar set of conclusions if, instead of us-
ing language to represent a qualia, we used another set
of constructs, such as those found in mathematics).
The related question of whether two people perceive
color in the same way arises as follows: When a given
self-aware organism perceives the color red, the neural
pathways being stimulated may be associated with other
neural pathways involved in the organismal self-image,
simply due to the fact that, while an organism perceives
its reality, it also receives information about itself. There-
fore, the color red that the organism perceives does not
exist in isolation, but rather is a construct that is asso-
ciated with, and therefore intrinsically tied to the organ-
ismal self-image.
However, a self-aware organism may associate its self-
image with the image of a second organism, and in this
way the neural pathways involved in processing the color
red may become associated with the second organism.
This leads to two related, yet distinct representations of
the color red in the first organism’s brain. The first repre-
sentation is one that associates red with the organism it-
self, while the second representation is one that associates
red with the second organism. These two constructs are
similar, and yet distinct, an internal contradiction that
can cause the organism to attempt to resolve whether or
not they are indeed the same or not. A natural ques-
tion that may then arise in the first organism’s brain is
whether the “red” that is associated with itself is the
same as the “red” associated with the second organism.
As with many of the constructs discussed in this pa-
per, this is a formally undecidable question, and can be
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regarded as tautologically true or false depending on how
one chooses to define the concept of color. If color is de-
fined to be intrinsically connected to the organism that is
perceiving it, then, strictly speaking, different organisms
do not perceive a given color in the same way. However,
if color is taken to be a concept that is distinct from the
organism perceiving it, then, if two organisms can com-
municate to one another agreement that a given color
is being observed, then by definition the two organisms
perceive color in the same way (since in this case it may
be argued that it is merely the representation of the color
that is being translated from one form to another).
D. How is it possible to deduce physical laws?
If it is possible to provide an explanation for the emer-
gence of self-awareness, then it is possible for “mind” to
understand “mind”. Like self-awareness itself, this is a
phenomenon that has also been a subject of extensive
philosophical debate.
To place this issue in proper context, we should note
that it belongs to a more general question: How is it that
the universe, through the process of Darwinian evolution,
has produced biochemical machines that are capable of
deducing the physical laws by which the universe was
created?
In proceeding to resolve this issue, we must first cau-
tion that, because of the problem of tautologies that
emerge in such discussions, e.g. the universe is simply
created by the organism itself, a resolution to this issue
is ultimately impossible. Therefore, our goal will not be
to provide an unambiguous resolution to this issue, but
rather to place it in the context of a useful framework.
When humans deduce physical laws, they are observing
a collection of physical phenomena that they then com-
pactify into a convenient representation. Whatever form
this representation takes (mathematics, language, a com-
puter program), the important point to note is that the
physical law itself is not really discovered, but rather is
translated from one representation into another. There-
fore, the deduction of physical laws may be likened to a
replication process, where a given collection of informa-
tion is replicated from one representation into another.
The human organism then becomes analogous to a cata-
lyst that catalyzes this replication process. The problem
of discovering how various aspects of reality function is
reduced to a question of whether replication of various
aspects of reality is possible. That self-replication is pos-
sible is a given, since there are self-replicating systems at
various levels of complexity (molecules, cells, organisms).
Furthermore, there are enzymes capable of catalyzing
the translation of information from one representation
into another, an important biological example being the
translation of genetic information from the nucleic acid
to the amino acid representation.
Although the deduction of physical laws essentially
amounts to the translation of information from one rep-
resentation into another, certain representations are pre-
ferred over others. This may be due to the fact that
certain representations are more convenient, in the sense
that they store the information in a form that is much
easier to manipulate. For example, since human be-
ings are capable of self-replication, one can argue that
we “know” how to make ourselves, and therefore human
beings already understand how human beings function.
However, this is a somewhat unsatisfactory conclusion.
Clearly, what scientific inquiry into human biology is
seeking is the translation of the physical representation
of a human being into the language representation, and
subsequently into a mathematical representation.
Because the discovery of how the brain works amounts
to translating the internal neural pathways from a phys-
ical representation into a language one, it suggests that
language is a kind of “mirror” into internal neural con-
structs. This implies that language, if properly and care-
fully used, could be used to infer the existence of previ-
ously undiscovered neural pathways in the brain. Fur-
thermore, it could give clues as to how known neural
pathways actually function.
An ability to translate the internal neural pathways
from a physical representation into a language one must
include the ability to translate the translation mechanism
itself. In principle this should be possible. To take a bio-
chemical example, the enzymes capable of catalyzing the
translation of genetic information from the nucleic acid
to the amino acid representation are themselves encoded
in the DNA chain, and may themselves be translated.
Ultimately, the scientific exploration of the physical
universe, including an understanding of the nature of self-
awareness, amounts to a search for self-contained, circu-
lar constructs that may be regarded as “self-replicating”
in a sense (i.e. we are looking for tautologies). These
circular constructs are then primitives that are only de-
fined with reference to themselves, and not to any kind of
philosophical notion of a higher truth (whether our real-
ity can be described by a finite or infinite number of such
“self-replicating” primitives is an undecidable question).
To illustrate why this must be the case, it may be ar-
gued that any analysis that a self-aware organism may
make about itself based on known physical laws is fun-
damentally circular, because the physical laws being em-
ployed were deduced by the brain doing the analysis. As
a result, the physical laws may be regarded as a prod-
uct of the organismal brain, and so any analysis based
on such laws is not really based on any kind of external,
“objective” constructs.
As was noted in the discussion on solipsism, from a
scientific perspective this is not a problem: We can take
the physical laws as primitives, from which we can de-
velop a set of pathways that lead to the development of
self-aware organisms that can deduce those laws. Alter-
natively, in the solipsistic point of view, we can take the
self-aware organism as a primitive, that then creates a
reality with a certain set of physical laws, which allow
for the emergence of self-aware organisms. Both views
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are equivalent, because both are self-contained.
E. Using language and set theory to understand
brain structure and neural network topology
We also claim that concepts from logic and set theory,
as well as the related field of pattern recognition [26, 27],
may be highly useful for understanding neural pathway
formation. The reason for this is that the human brain is
capable of deducing physical laws, and developing various
abstract concepts such as number, infinity, and proof-by-
contradiction. While we may take these constructs as
primitives, if we want to fully understand how a collec-
tion of neurons forms a human brain, then we must un-
derstand how such a collection can develop the various
abstract concepts described above.
Set and logic theory provides a foundation for all of
mathematics that is based on primitives called sets, with
the derivation of all subsequent concepts via various as-
sociations formed between sets. Any aspect of the ob-
servable universe may ultimately be defined using set-
theoretic constructs. Because it is believed that brain
function is driven by the formation of neural pathways
that define various associations between neurons, it is
likely that set theory could be used to infer the struc-
ture of neural pathways corresponding to various abstract
concepts. Furthermore, set and logic theory may provide
a rigorous framework for understanding the tautologies
that emerge in discussions on self-awareness, since the
identification of tautologies is one of the central objec-
tives of set theory.
F. Organismal curiousity
Earlier in this paper, we postulated that organismal cu-
riousity may play a key role for the emergence of the phe-
nomenon of “awareness of self-awareness”. The argument
was based on the claim that, through a process of asso-
ciative learning, a sufficiently intelligent brain would de-
velop contradictory associations. If the brain was wired
with a natural curiousity, it would attempt to resolve
these internal contradictions, which is ultimately impos-
sible because they are tautologies. The result is that such
a brain would be caught in a kind of “loop”, which would
lead to the “pondering” behavior that is characteristic of
highly self-aware organisms.
We therefore claim that curiosity is an essential mini-
mal feature that must be incorporated into any machine
that is designed to be self-aware. As a result, it makes
sense to conclude this paper with a speculation on the
evolutionary basis for the emergence of such behavior in
complex organisms.
As an organism with a sufficiently complex brain ob-
serves the world, it may develop various associations that
provide useful constructs for processing the sensory in-
formation it obtains. If some of the sensory information
leads to contradictory associations, one course of action
is for the organismal brain to simply ignore the contra-
dictions. Indeed, holding two contradictory thoughts is
a commonly observed phenomenon, termed cognitive dis-
sonance.
However, such behavior might not be optimal for or-
ganismal survival. As an example, an organism might
be hard-wired to have an innate fear of objects it does
not recognize. This behavior can confer a survival ad-
vantage to the organism, since it does not attempt to
enter into potentially life-threatening situations that it
does not know how to handle. On the other hand, the
disadvantage of such behavior is that it may prevent the
organism from taking advantage of new opportunities,
such as a previously unseen food source. Therefore, a
more balanced response for an organism is to attempt
to obtain more information about its environment, when
the incoming sensory information consists of contradic-
tory components and is therefore inconclusive.
Whatever its evolutionary basis may be, organismal
curiousity is a behavior that emerges from a collec-
tion of neurons acting under the influence of a reward-
punishment-based pathway selection mechanism. Under-
standing how such a mechanism, with its associated re-
ward and stress-response-inducing chemicals, leads to the
emergence of organismal curiosity, is an important area
of both theoretical and experimental work.
G. Associative learning as the basic algorithm for
extracting information about a system
One final issue that we should address is the basis for
using associative learning as the algorithm for determin-
ing how various systems function. To formulate the an-
swer to this question, we may note that determining how
a system functions is analogous to reading the content
of a linear data stream, where the data stream contains
the necessary information defining the given system. In
general, if we do not have any a priori information about
the system, then we do not know the length of the data
stream, or even if the data stream terminates. Therefore,
there is no guarantee that we will be able to fully read
the data stream, and hence the question as to whether
it will be possible to fully determine how a given system
functions is ultimately unresolvable.
Despite this uncertainty, it is still possible to attempt
to read as much of the data stream as possible in a given
amount of time, and to attempt as faithful a reconstruc-
tion of the system as possible. The difficulty that arises
is that the data stream may be too large to be read at
once. That is, the machine reading the data stream may
only be able to read in short strands of data at a time.
Reconstructing the full data stream then requires the ma-
chine to look for associations between the various strands.
That is, the machine may notice that one data strand is
present with another data strand, so that the two may
actually be the successive components of a larger strand
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within the data stream. Gradually, as more and more
strand-strand associations are determined, the full data
stream may be reconstructed.
Associative learning is therefore a natural tool that
arises for reconstructing systems, because it is a mech-
anism that allows for the integration of partial observa-
tions of a system in such a way that the system may be
fully decoded and then reconstructed. It should also be
noted that the decoding scheme described here is similar
to gene sequencing methods, where many copies of short
strands of DNA are analyzed and compared for overlaps,
in order to determine the likelihood of various strand-
strand associations and thereby reconstruct the whole
genome [28]. Gene-gene interactions are also discovered
by looking for correlations, or associations, in gene ex-
pression data [29].
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